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“We do not prosecute by public pressure or by petition.  We 
prosecute based on the facts on any given case as well as the laws of 
the state of Florida.”1  This might have seemed like an unremarkable 
claim were it not made by Florida State Attorney Angela Corey about 
George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon Martin.2  While on 
 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.  Thanks to 
Phoenix Cai, Kim Chanbonpin, Jack Chin, Russ Covey, Donald Dripps, William 
Edmondson, Yaniv Heled, Tim Kuhner, Paul Lombardo, Caren Morrison, Mike 
Simons, Wadie Said, Shirin Sinnar, Lauren Sudeall-Lucas, Jonathan Todres, Anne 
Tucker, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, and Ron Wright for thoughtful comments on 
earlier drafts.   
 1  George Zimmerman Murder Charge Sets Up Hurdles for Prosecutors in Trayvon Martin 
Shooting, CBSNEWS.COM  (Apr. 12, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
201_162-57412881/george-zimmerman-murder-charge-sets-up-hurdles-for-
prosecutors-in-trayvon-martin-shooting/. 
 2  See id. 
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“neighborhood watch” Zimmerman shot Martin, an African-
American teenager.3  The prosecutor for Seminole County, where the 
shooting occurred, resisted prosecuting Zimmerman given the 
likelihood he would assert self-defense or, to use Florida’s statutory 
language, that he “st[ood] his . . . ground.”4  Subsequently, Florida’s 
governor appointed Angela Corey to the case; she decided to 
prosecute Zimmerman for second-degree murder.5  Zimmerman’s 
recent acquittal might appear to vindicate Seminole County’s initial 
decision not to prosecute.  That, however, is only true if one views 
prosecutorial success exclusively in terms of obtaining convictions.  
That view is incorrect because prosecutors have the unique capacity 
to generate political meaning separate and apart from obtaining 
convictions. 
The uproar over Martin’s death echoed conflict that erupted 
over “Stand Your Ground” when Florida first adopted that language 
in 2005.6  In light of that history, Angela Corey’s ultimate decision to 
prosecute George Zimmerman could not have been anything but 
“political.”  Florida’s Stand Your Ground law leaves much to 
prosecutorial discretion and charging decisions are not typically 
reviewable by a court.7  That prosecutors only elected to charge 
Zimmerman after national uproar erupted over Martin’s death calls 
her quote into serious question.  Corey casts politics and 
prosecutorial discretion as binary opposites.  She implies that politics 
is a purely exogenous force that threatens the integrity of 
prosecutorial decision-making.  She suggests that prosecutorial 
discretion is simply the professional judgment intrinsic to the 
interpretive exercise of applying law to fact.  Discretion, in other 
words, is principled while politics is not.8  Corey’s stark, binary 
opposition between politics and discretion has parallels in legal 
scholarship. 
 
 3  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-Degree 
Murder in Shooting of Martin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1. 
 4  Id.; FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013). 
 5  See Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3. 
 6  See discussion infra Part III.B.i. 
 7  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). 
 8  Many would contend that, insofar as the Martin killing was concerned, 
“politics” was more principled than prosecutorial discretion.  See Kim Severson, Black 
Man’s Killing in Georgia Eludes Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, at A1 (implying that 
prosecutor unfairly declined self-defense case in the absence of public pressure akin 
to that precipitated by Trayvon Martin’s death); Mallory Simon & Ann O’Neill, 
Unstable ground: The Fine Line Between Self-Defense and Murder, CNN.COM, (Apr. 30, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/29/us/stand-your-ground. 
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This Article shows that the politics-discretion binary is pervasive 
in criminal-justice scholarship and typically takes one of two forms.  
In the first version (“Binary 1”), politics is a problem while in the 
second version (“Binary 2”), discretion is.  In Binary 1, politics is to 
blame for criminal justice’s harsh excesses over the last three 
decades.9  Politics is a toxic force impelled by the public’s taste for 
vengeance.10  By this account, a fearful and easily manipulated public 
readily embraces the “tough on crime” rhetoric that politicians feed 
it.  This dynamic, in turn, impels the creation of not just more 
criminal laws, but broader and harsher ones.11  Legislators are 
perfectly willing to pass these laws knowing that prosecutors will have 
the final say on what sort of cases are actually brought.  In other 
words, prosecutorial discretion is the check on politics’ punitive 
excesses. 
In Binary 2, discretion is the problem.  Those who embrace this 
version take an internal view of criminal justice and tend to be 
preoccupied with agency costs.12  Accounts in this camp have 
analogized prosecutors’ offices to administrative agencies.13  The 
analogy is readily made in the federal context given that federal 
prosecutors are unelected.14  But even in the state context, the 
analogy is plausible: prosecutors have broad discretion to interpret 
and apply public law, the vast majority of which occurs outside public 
 
 9  See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 49–59 (2003) (arguing that 
American criminal justice policy is, ironically, harsher than Europe’s on account of 
its democratic, non-status based history); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 1969, 1982 (2008) [hereinafter Unequal Justice] (identifying political and legal 
reasons for inequality in American criminal justice). 
 10  See Unequal Justice, supra note 9, at 1982 (arguing that in a system where 
suburban voters have political strength criminal justice policy will “oscillate[] . . . 
between wholesale indifference and unmitigated rage”).  
 11  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 532–33 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological Politics]. 
 12  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963–64 (2009); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, 
Prosecutors As Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1507 (2010); Ronald Wright & 
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 86 (2002) 
[hereinafter Tradeoff]. 
 13  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874 (2009); Darryl K. Brown, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 331–42 (2004); Gerald E. 
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2129, 
2132–36 (1998); Marc. L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
125, 137 (2008) [hereinafter Black Box]; Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, 
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752–53 (2003). 
 14  See Barkow, supra note 13, at 876.  
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view.15  This raises the possibility of significant agency costs—for 
example, prosecutors too readily decline cases or offer significant 
discounts to defendants who are willing to plead guilty.16  Internal 
solutions to these kinds of problems emphasize bureaucratic changes 
that promote vigorous supervisory control over prosecutorial 
discretion.  The purpose is to align prosecutors’ incentives with 
“stakeholders’” interests, of which the public is one.17  “Public” here 
does not refer to the amorphous group of bloodlust-gripped citizens 
that Binary 1 assumes, but rather a more localized group of citizens 
that has definable interests regarding public safety and justice.  
Accordingly, the politics that this public might generate is a check on 
prosecutorial discretion. 
Both versions of the politics-discretion binary are worthy of 
critique.  Both cast politics as exogenous to prosecutorial decision-
making: politics is either an external constraint or an external 
impetus.  Both versions also embrace homogenized notions of the 
“public.”  In Binary 1, the “public” possesses shared and readily 
identifiable biases and fears.  In Binary 2, the “public” possesses a set 
of shared and readily identifiable interests.  Depending on which 
binary one embraces, the regulatory question will either be how best 
to insulate prosecutors from politics or how best to expose them to it. 
Neither binary, however, offers guidance for how to think about 
the prosecutorial role in the face of a heterogeneous public.  
Heterogeneity is the defining feature of a pluralist democracy like 
our own; different people have profoundly different views regarding 
political and social issues.  The “public,” whether writ large or small, 
will not be unified in its beliefs, interests, or biases.  The central 
normative dilemma in a liberal democracy is how to make public 
choices that are legitimate and just in the face of such 
heterogeneity.18  Criminal justice illustrates the dilemma lucidly.  It 
often implicates issues of unique political and emotional salience—
for example, questions regarding what “victimhood” and “harm” 
mean, what the scope of an individual’s right to use deadly force 
should be, and when mistakes of judgment should be punished.  
These, of course, were precisely the sorts of questions implicated by 
 
 15  See Black Box, supra note 13, at 137 (noting that plea bargaining’s prevalence 
suggests decline of adversarial process in favor of administrative process).  
 16  See Tradeoff, supra note 12 at 86. 
 17  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–64; Black Box, supra note 13, at 187–91.  
 18  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xxv (2005) (“How is it possible 
that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens 
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”). 
SEKHON (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:42 PM 
2014] THE PEDAGOGICAL PROSECUTOR 5 
 
the Martin shooting and subsequent Zimmerman prosecution. 
Prosecutors have unique power to generate social and political 
meaning through their discretionary choices—for example, to 
prosecute or decline cases.  While that power derives from 
prosecutors’ authority to punish, it is not reducible to it.  Prosecutors’ 
capacity to generate political and social meaning is particularly 
significant when they enforce a law around which there is (or has 
been) “expressive conflict”—that is, public disagreement about the 
content or value of the message that specific legislation sends.19  Such 
conflict often takes the form of a debate as to what the effects of a 
particular law are or will be.  For example, proponents of Florida’s 
Stand Your Ground law argued that the law reaffirmed a citizen’s 
right to defend herself and would deter would-be assailants from 
victimizing her.20  Opponents argued that the law communicated a 
“shoot first, ask questions later” ethos that would encourage vigilante 
justice.21 
The passage of a law around which there has been expressive 
conflict does not extinguish the basis for conflict.  Rather, passing a 
law just shifts the conflict’s locus to prosecutors’ offices.  Criminal 
laws often rely on vague and general language subject to competing 
interpretations.  Such ambiguity will require prosecutors to make 
choices that implicate the very questions that animated expressive 
debate about the law itself.  For example, hate-crime laws typically 
enhance punishments for criminal misconduct that occurred 
“because of” discrimination.  Whether such language should just 
encompass majority-on-minority violence or should extend to 
minority-on-majority (or minority-on-minority) violence is 
expressively fraught.  This dilemma echoes the debate that swirled 
around the passage of hate-crime laws in the 1990s: do they promote 
or compromise equality?22 
Asking how prosecutors should use their unique expressive 
power presents an opportunity to rethink our ideals regarding the 
prosecutorial function in a pluralistic society.  Most scholarship 
concerning prosecutorial discretion is preoccupied with the question 
of how best to channel or restrain prosecutorial discretion.  This 
Article takes a different tack on the accountability question.  It asks, 
what role should prosecutors play in holding the public and 
 
 19  See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 20  See infra notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
 21  See id. 
 22  See infra Part III.B.ii.  
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legislatures accountable?  The answer takes us beyond the binary 
formulations that prevail in the scholarly literature. 
Drawing on political theory, this Article argues that prosecutors 
should use their unique expressive power pedagogically—that is, to 
advance constructive political dialogue in legislatures and amongst 
citizens.  Doing so would serve two interests.  First, it would 
encourage legislatures to revisit criminal laws in light of the effects 
those laws are having in society.  Second, it would promote more 
intensive public engagement with criminal-justice policy.  Both 
interests are particularly important where a criminal law has been the 
subject of expressive conflict, as was true for Stand Your Ground and 
hate-crime laws.  A liberal democracy’s dynamism turns on both 
citizens’ and policy makers’ willingness to not only engage with 
pressing social questions, but to revisit and reconsider earlier 
positions they may have held regarding those questions.  Prosecutors 
are uniquely situated to facilitate this process.  Viewed through a 
pedagogical framework, prosecutors’ obligations would be less rigidly 
dependent upon obtaining convictions—a trial loss, as in Zimmerman, 
should not necessarily signify failure. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II reveals the extent to 
which the discretion-politics binary saturates recent scholarly 
literature on prosecutorial decision-making.  While descriptively 
instructive, this scholarship does not properly conceptualize the 
significance of prosecutorial discretion in the face of democratic 
pluralism.  Part III demonstrates how and why prosecutorial choices 
have expressive power.  It uses Stand Your Ground and hate-crime 
laws as examples.  Part IV draws on liberal precepts to argue that the 
ideal prosecutor should be a “pedagogical” one.  Where ethically 
possible, prosecutors should use their expressive power to promote 
both legislative accountability and public dialogue.  Both of these 
interests are particularly important where there has been expressive 
conflict around the relevant criminal law.  However, prosecutors’ 
obligation to promote accountability and dialogue should not end 
there.  It should also extend to those criminal laws that are presently 
uncontroversial, only because the legislature and public are not 
paying attention. 
II. POLITICS AND DISCRETION 
Recent scholarship regarding prosecutorial discretion tends to 
draw a binary opposition between politics and discretion.  While law 
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scholars have long recognized prosecutorial discretion’s breadth,23 
the last fifteen years have seen them turn to public choice theory and 
organizational behavior to make sense of that reality.24  Those who 
have highlighted legislatures’ profligate willingness to enact new 
criminal laws tend to embrace what this Article refers to as “Binary 
1.”25  Binary 1 posits politics as the problem and prosecutorial 
discretion as an imperfect bulwark against it.  Passing criminal laws 
allows legislators, with relatively little cost, to secure the expressive 
purchase of being “tough on crime.”26  This appeals to members of 
the voting public whose anxieties about crime are as deep as its 
attention spans are shallow.27  By this account, sensationalist episodes 
of violence galvanize a public that is otherwise indifferent to criminal 
justice policy.28  If one accepts this view, it is pretty clear why savvy 
politicians would have an easy time seducing the public with tough-
on-crime rhetoric.  Politicians do not have to worry about the 
consequences of the criminal laws they endorse because those laws 
authorize enforcement without requiring it.  This holds true even in 
district attorney elections.29  The difficult questions of how to 
organize enforcement priorities are left to low-visibility prosecutorial 
choices that lie well outside public purview or interest.30 
Given the “pathological” politics of criminal law,31 the 
opportunities for criminal prosecutions are virtually unlimited. In the 
face of this reality, prosecutors tend towards leniency—they charge 
far fewer crimes and demand far less punishment than the criminal 
 
 23  See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
193–94 (1970) [hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE]; James Vorenberg, Decent 
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1981).   
 24  On the public choice front, see, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, 
Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn 
About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1993); William J. 
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 803–05 
(2006) [hereinafter Political Constitution]; On the organizational behavior front, see, 
e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 996–1015; Richman, supra note 13, at 753. 
 25  See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE 169 (2007) [hereinafter ARBITRARY 
JUSTICE] (arguing politics insufficient to hold prosecutors accountable); Bibas, supra 
note 12 at 984 (“Voters . . . focus[ ] on memorable but unrepresentative stories.”).   
 26  See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 532–33. 
 27  See Bibas, supra note 12, at 987–88 (noting that the public suffers from 
“chronic misperceptions” about how criminal justice systems function); Dripps, supra 
note 24, at 1089 (arguing public adopts victim’s perspective). 
 28  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 983–87; Unequal Justice, supra note 9, at 1982. 
 29  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 985–86; Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, 
Prosecutors As Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1508 (2010). 
 30  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 13, at 874; Bibas, supra note 12, at 964. 
 31  See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 532–33.  
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law would permit.32  However, because prosecutorial charging 
discretion is not generally subject to judicial review, some scholars 
worry about consistency and egalitarianism.33  Until recently, 
aggressive external—typically judicial—regulation was the answer 
offered in response to these worries.34 
Recent criminal-justice scholarship is deeply skeptical of whether 
external regulation of prosecutors, political or judicial, is effective or 
even possible.35  These scholars tend to embrace what this Article calls 
“Binary 2.”  In this version of the binary, discretion is the problem 
and the solution lies in properly aligning prosecutors’ incentives with 
the public’s interests.  Among these scholars, the trend has been to 
look to administrative law and management theory for guidance.  
Beginning with Gerald Lynch’s 1998 article, scholars have 
increasingly analogized prosecutors’ offices to administrative 
agencies.36  Lynch argued that federal criminal justice is more akin to 
an inquisitorial than adversarial system.  Federal prosecutors, not 
judges, are the inquisitors who determine guilt and innocence.37  
Because the system is analogous to an administrative one, Lynch 
argued in favor of applying administrative law’s accountability 
principles to prosecutors.38  A number of writers have expanded on 
Lynch’s core insight.39 
 
 32  See id.  
 33  See, e.g., ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 17; Vorenberg, supra note 23, at 
1555–56. 
 34  See, e.g., DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 207; Vorenberg, supra note 
23, at 1570–71. 
 35  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 13, at 873–74; see also Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–
64 (describing external controls as only “moderately promising” vehicle for aligning 
prosecutors’ interests with the public’s); Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 53 (questioning 
efficacy of external controls).  These scholars tend to view “external” regulation with 
a somewhat jaundiced eye and propose “internal” approaches in lieu or in addition 
to external ones.  The mechanism by which prosecutors’ offices would adopt such 
internal reforms, however, remains elusive—i.e., absent some form of political, 
moral, or bureaucratic pressure from an external source, what will impel any given 
prosecutors’ office to self-regulate more stringently?  Technocratic solutions cannot 
easily sidestep this fundamental question of political will.  Cf. David Cole, Turning the 
Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 39–40 (2011) (suggesting that 
public’s willingness to identify with those in jail and prison could help end “mass 
incarceration” in the United States). 
 36  Lynch, supra note 13, at 2117. 
 37  Id. at 2129. 
 38  Id. at 2143 (arguing prosecutors should issue regulations and hold formal 
hearings). 
 39  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 13, at 874; Black Box, supra note 13, at 137; 
Richman, supra note 13, at 752–53. 
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In Lynch’s wake, scholars have proposed bureaucratic and 
corporate techniques to minimize agency costs,40 maximize fidelity to 
law,41 and promote consistent, egalitarian decision-making.42  These 
scholars assume that traditional electoral and political checks will 
only restrain prosecutors in high-profile cases.43  The vast majority of 
cases, however, are not high-profile, and for these cases the criminal 
justice system is totally opaque.44  In these cases, prosecutors will make 
choices that serve their own institutional purposes.  While 
maximizing their overall conviction rate is typically one of these 
purposes, it does not mean that prosecutors will obtain convictions in 
ways that conform to popular understandings of fairness.45  The 
prevalence of plea-bargaining in our criminal justice system generates 
significant agency costs that pull in the direction of undue harshness 
or leniency.  For example, prosecutors may overcharge some 
defendants with the expectation of charge bargaining to induce 
guilty pleas.46  With other defendants, prosecutors may offer 
significant sentence reductions in order to induce pleas.47 
Recent scholarship is highly skeptical of external reforms like 
banning plea-bargaining.48  Instead, for example, Stephanos Bibas has 
argued for using a corporate law model to align prosecutors’ 
institutional incentives with the public’s and other “stakeholders’” 
interests.49  Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, in a series of articles, 
have suggested that more intensive, internal case screening and data 
monitoring will improve the consistency and fairness of prosecutorial 
 
 40  See Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–64; Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–
50; see also Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 86 (discussing the agency cost problem that 
arises when charge reduction is permitted in plea bargaining). 
 41  See Black Box, supra note 13, at 129. 
 42  See id. at 132. 
 43  Cf. Bibas, supra note 12, at 984 (suggesting that public tends to pay inordinate 
attention to certain high-profile cases).  
 44  See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912–13 (2006) (describing the dominance of “insiders” within 
criminal justice bureaucracies). 
 45  See id. at 935–36 (suggesting a D.A.’s high conviction rate says little about the 
terms on which the conviction was obtained); Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 
549–50. 
 46  See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 519–20. 
 47  See id. at 519–20. 
 48  See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 31 & nn.6–7 (criticizing external approach and 
enumerating its proponents). 
 49  See Bibas, supra note 12, at 996–1015 (advocating for changes to prosecutors’ 
office structure, personnel policies, and office culture).   
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choices.50  They hypothesize that intensive screening would help 
ensure that only viable cases are prosecuted and encourage more 
trials and open pleas.51  Other proposals have included splitting off 
prosecutors’ offices’ adjudicative functions from their investigative 
functions as is the case with administrative agencies.52 
Implicit in both binaries are assumptions about politics, the 
public, and criminal law that are worthy of critique.  First, “the 
public” is cast as a relatively stable entity with identifiable interests 
that exogenously impel or restrain prosecutorial decision-making.  
Binary 1 homogenizes “the public” by assuming the existence of an 
undifferentiated public taste for vengeance.  Similarly, the notion of 
agency costs, so central to Binary 2, assumes that it is possible to 
identify a shared public interest in particular criminal justice 
outcomes.53  If one understands the “public interest” at a high level of 
generality—for example, community safety—and the relevant 
community is quite small, “the public” might seem homogeneous.  
The more granular the definition of interests and the broader the 
geographic unit, however, the more fragmented “the public” will 
appear.  Even within a neighborhood, for example, there are often 
very different views of what constitutes a crime problem.54  In light of 
this, it should not be surprising that there is so much disagreement 
about when self-defense should be available to someone who has 
killed another.  Such pluralism is a defining feature of democratic 
coexistence.  Scholarship on prosecutorial discretion does not 
provide a useful normative framework for thinking about how 
prosecutors should make decisions in the face of such pluralism. 
Of course, one might think that the criminal law itself suggests 
some optimal level of prosecution.  In theory, the law reflects the 
legislature’s settled view of a particular issue.  Thereafter, prosecutors 
must simply apply the law.  This was Prosecutor Corey’s suggestion.55  
It is, however, a wildly implausible one given the number of criminal 
 
 50  See, e.g., Black Box, supra note 13, at 166–72; Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 31–36.  
They are very clear that their goal is not to achieve justice in individual cases, but a 
better-run prosecutors’ office. Id. at 49–55.  By that, they mean fair and consistent 
across cases. Id. at 49–50. 
 51  See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 49–55. 
 52  See Barkow, supra note 13, at 874. 
 53  See Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–64; Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–
50; see also Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 86 (discussing the agency cost problem that 
arises when charge reduction is permitted in plea bargaining). 
 54  See SUDHIR ALLADI VENTAKESH, OFF THE BOOKS 72–73 (2006). 
 55  See supra Part I. 
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laws and the vague language that often comprise them.56  For 
example, a law permitting use of deadly force where reasonably 
necessary to thwart an imminent aggression does not, in and of itself, 
suggest the terms of optimal application.57  This will be all the more 
true where laws are crafted using terms whose meanings are 
themselves subject of expressive uncertainty as is true with hate-crime 
laws.  The next section develops these points in detail. 
III. PROSECUTION AND PLURALISM 
Prosecutorial choices have the capacity to generate expressive 
meaning that amplifies, diminishes, or operates in complete 
disjunction from the criminal laws under which a case might be 
brought.  In a pluralistic society like our own, this power is 
particularly significant where there has been expressive conflict over 
a criminal law.  Prosecutors will have to exercise their near absolute 
discretion to charge or decline cases in the absence of public 
consensus as to when such a law should apply, if ever. Typically, such 
a law’s black letter will not answer how prosecutors should exercise 
their discretion either. 
Section A describes prosecutors’ power to generate expressive 
meaning and how that power relates to criminal laws.  Following that 
theoretical discussion, Section B uses Stand Your Ground and hate-
crime laws as case studies.  In both contexts, the underlying criminal 
law was subject to expressive conflict prior to passage.  Both sets of 
laws leave vast discretion to prosecutors.  The charging decisions that 
prosecutors must make under these laws often implicate the very 
issues that generated expressive conflict around the underlying 
criminal laws when they were enacted. 
Many assumed that Stand Your Ground accounts for 
prosecutors’ sluggishness in charging George Zimmerman.  That 
assumption is not warranted.  The conflict around Stand Your 
Ground congealed around the legislature’s use of that particular 
rhetorical flourish.  The law, however, leaves prosecutors 
considerable room to make discretionary choices that implicate the 
very questions that gave rise to conflict around the law when it was 
enacted.58  For example, the charging decisions in the Zimmerman 
case impelled fierce debate about the right to protect oneself, racism, 
 
 56  See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 529–33.   
 57  See infra Part III.B.i. 
 58  See infra notes 121–131. 
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and gun violence.59  While the trial did not produce the catharsis that 
some might have hoped for, in a liberal democracy there is intrinsic 
value in public airing. 
A similar story can be told about hate-crime laws.  The debate 
over whether enacting hate-crime laws is a good idea has long past.  
That, however, cannot be taken to mean that there is broad social 
consensus as to what constitutes a hate crime or when punishment 
for such is appropriate—for example, should minority-on-minority or 
minority-on-majority attacks count as hate crimes?  Section C 
concludes by arguing that although head prosecutors are typically 
elected, prosecutors’ expressive obligations should not exclusively be 
to the local, electoral unit. 
A. Expressive Enforcement 
The mere existence of a criminal law does not foretell how, or if, 
it will be enforced.  This means that prosecutorial decision-making 
potentially has the expressive potential to amplify, diminish, or act in 
complete disjunction from the criminal law’s underlying message. 
Expressive accounts of criminal law identify public denunciation 
as its defining feature.60  “Public denunciation” means condemnation 
leveled by the State.  Such condemnation distinguishes “hard 
treatment” from a “criminal sanction.”  In a complex society 
thoroughly penetrated by state apparatuses, hard treatment will come 
in myriad forms.  That it severely impinges upon an individual’s 
economic or liberty interests, however, does not make hard treatment 
a “criminal sanction”61—there are circumstances in which the State 
levies hefty fines or compels one individual to pay another to satisfy a 
court-ordered judgment.62  The State might even preventively detain 
an individual to forestall future harm,63 but it does so without 
expressly condemning the detainee.  Unaccompanied by official 
 
 59  See infra notes 108–114, and accompanying text. 
 60  See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING 98–101 (1970); Dan M. Kahan, The 
Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419–21 (1999).  Professor Kahan is 
credited with reigniting interest in expressive theory in the criminal context.  See 
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1363, 1369–70 (2000). 
 61  See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 96; KAHAN, supra note 60, at 419–21. 
 62  See KAHAN, supra note 60, at 419. 
 63  See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and 
War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 695–96 (2009) (describing state and federal contexts in 
which preventive detention is permitted).  
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condemnation, hard treatment is simply hard treatment.64 
Condemnation is a searing symbolic performance—it proclaims 
collective judgment that particular persons are less worthy than 
others.  Calling those who engage in misconduct “criminals” is to 
degrade them.  Expressive theories posit that the act of degrading 
produces “social meaning” that, in turn, generates material effects.65  
It may, however, be difficult to precisely identify those effects.  For 
example, “social meaning” might mean creating new (or reaffirming 
existing) social norms, enhancing a specific group’s dignity, 
generating public feelings of security, or cultivating public 
perception of the state’s competence to deal with pressing social 
problems.  Such effects need not be mutually exclusive.  Congress’s 
recent enactment of a federal hate-crime law relating to LGBT 
victims presents a good example.66 
Although the law does not contemplate an aggressive 
enforcement mechanism, advocates vigorously supported its 
passage.67  The law sends the message that attacking LGBT persons is 
no less a violation of equality precepts than discriminatory attacks 
against other minorities.  Advocates hope that this in turn will 
consolidate norms of tolerance for LGBT persons, if not deeper 
bonds of civic friendship between them and others.68  Advocates, 
however, would be hard-pressed to identify the precise sociological 
mechanism(s) by which a hate-crime law will generate such effects.  
Such a law acts in conjunction with an array of social forces the net 
effect of which is, hopefully, greater social acceptance of LGBT 
persons.  It is, however, difficult to imagine how this would happen in 
the absence of vigorous federal enforcement.69  This invites the more 
general question of what expressive relationship, if any, exists 
between a law and its enforcement. 
 
 64  See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 98. 
 65  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
453, 471–74 (1997) (discussing stigma’s capacity to shape behavioral norms); 
Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 520–21. 
 66  See Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). 
 67  See Michael F. Pabian, The Hate Crimes Prevention Act: Political Symbol or 
Prosecutorial Tool?, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 347, 347 (2012).  
 68   While a deontologist may be satisfied with a relation of tolerance, a 
communitarian would likely not be.  See Nirej S. Sekhon, Equality and Identity 
Hierarchy, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 349, 365–66 (2008).  The communitarian would 
seek to promote deeper bonds between citizens.  See id. at 377–78.   
 69  See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or 
Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1267 (2000). 
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Intuitively, we expect some relationship between the social 
meaning produced by a criminal law and the specific cases brought 
under that law.  A criminal law both denounces a category of conduct 
and confers discretionary authority upon prosecutors to condemn 
specific individuals for engaging in such conduct.  Criminal laws are 
generally enacted with the expectation that they will be enforced and 
have some impact in the world.  Scholars have recognized the 
intuition,70 but much of the work on enforcement and social meaning 
to date has focused on how low-level criminal law enforcement—in 
poor communities, in particular—generate norms of law-
abidingness.71  In contrast, this article asks what relationship exists 
between the social meaning legislative enactments generate—for 
example, the actual Stand Your Ground law—and the prosecutorial 
choices made pursuant to such laws.  The answer is particularly 
important where a law like Stand Your Ground is enacted for the very 
purpose of making a broad expressive statement. 
There are three ways in which the two orders of social meaning 
will interact: amplification, diminution, or disjunction.  Empirically, 
the relationships will be complex and, often, indeterminable.  The 
empirical difficulties that stymie sociological conclusions about law 
and social meaning will be even more nettlesome when assessing the 
relationships between law and prosecutorial practices.72  This is in 
part because prosecutorial practices include non-action—that is, 
declining cases—about which the world typically hears nothing.  In 
this regard, the case against George Zimmerman is exceptional. 
One might expect a straightforward amplification or diminution 
in the relation between law and prosecutorial practice where a 
criminal law expressly affirms the value of victims’ lives.  For example, 
Congress criminalized human trafficking because it is “a 
contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are 
predominantly women and children . . . .”73  Despite the bold 
 
 70  See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 104 (“[U]nreliable enforcement gives rise to 
doubts that the law really means what it says.”); Beale, supra note 69, at 1267; 
Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 521.  
 71  See infra notes 174–175 and accompanying text.  
 72  Even in the rare cases where data regarding prosecutorial choices is made 
available, interpreters are left to make educated guesses about the reasons for 
particular choices.  See Black Box, supra note 13, at 149–53 (speculating on the causes 
of changes in the rates at which New Orleans prosecutors charge/decline domestic 
violence cases). 
 73  Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, § 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1467 (2006) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 
(2013)). 
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language, there have been strikingly few prosecutions.74  Positive 
social meaning regarding the value of victims’ lives is likely generated 
in proportion to the actual enforcement of the trafficking law for a 
couple of reasons.  First, prosecuting cases keeps the plight of victims 
in the public eye.  Second, and related, prosecution also highlights 
the government’s seriousness about making good on its legislative 
commitment to victims—that is, successful prosecutions will amplify 
the legislative message that trafficking victims are actually not 
“slaves.”  Non-enforcement very likely sends the exact opposite 
message.75  This intuitive amplification relation, however, may not 
always hold. 
Overly aggressive enforcement may diminish the social meaning 
that a contested criminal law was supposed to produce.  Take for 
example the recent criminal conviction and sentencing of Dharun 
Ravi in New Jersey.  A jury convicted Ravi for eavesdropping on his 
gay college roommate Tyler Clementi’s sexual encounter with 
another man.76  As widely reported, Clementi killed himself soon after 
learning of what Ravi had done.77  A jury convicted Ravi under New 
Jersey’s “bias intimidation law.”78  The conviction and sentencing 
generated national controversy with many suggesting that 
prosecutors overreached.79  Even prominent LGBT advocates were 
split on whether a harsh sentence for Ravi would help or hinder their 
political agenda.80  Echoing intuitions about amplification and 
diminution described in the paragraph above, many advocates felt 
that a harsh sentence would signify the value of LGBT lives and New 
Jersey’s commitment to equality.81  Other advocates, however, feared 
 
 74  See Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health Law 
Approach to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 457–58 & n.36 (2011) 
(questioning the practical value of criminalization). 
 75  Cf. id.; see also Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 521. 
 76  See Kate Zernike, 30-Day Term for Spying on Roommate at Rutgers, N.Y. TIMES, May 
22, 2012, at A1. 
 77  See id.  
 78  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:16-1 (West 2013). New Jersey’s statute makes it a crime 
to engage in any of a series of enumerated crimes with intention to intimidate based 
upon specified criteria, including sexual orientation. Id.  The New Jersey statute is 
fairly typical of statutes that criminalize bias-related acts.  See infra notes 148–150 and 
accompanying text. 
 79  See generally Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/02/06/120206fa_fact_parker?currentP
age=all. 
 80  See Kate Zernike, In Rutgers Spying Case, Voices for Gay Rights Urge Leniency, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2012, at A1. 
 81  See id.   
SEKHON(DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:42 PM 
16 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1 
 
that a harsh sentence would offend broad-based public sentiments 
about LGBT people receiving undeserved special recognition—that 
is, a harsh sentence could send the message that LGBT victims’ lives 
were being treated as more valuable than those of non-LGBT victims 
on account of LGBT groups’ political clout.82  This fear was not 
necessarily driven by social conservatives’ reactions.  By some 
mainstream liberal accounts, Ravi’s misconduct was more attributable 
to juvenile stupidity than to homophobic malevolence.83  The actual, 
relatively light sentence meted out reflects this notion.84 
The Ravi case suggests how prosecutorial choices may 
differentially produce social meaning among majority and minority 
groups.  While prosecutorial choices may affirm the social meaning 
produced by a law in one community, they may diminish it in 
another.  The prosecution of criminal cases in the Jim Crow South 
presents a fairly extreme example.85  Criminal laws forbidding killing 
and other grievous violence were rarely enforced in response to 
violence within black communities, let alone between white 
aggressors and black victims.86  The systematic non-enforcement of 
criminal law helped sustain blacks’ inferior social status.87  Laws of 
general application are supposed to apply in equal measure to all 
human beings; the State’s refusal to act in response to black 
victimhood consolidated the racist sentiment of blacks’ social status 
as subhuman.  In this regard, non-enforcement amplified the 
defining ethos of the Jim Crow legal order.88 
The line between diminution and disjunction will often be fuzzy. 
Critics of the Ravi prosecutions could have plausibly argued that it 
diminished or was disjointed from New Jersey’s hate-crime law.  A 
 
 82  See id.  
 83  Ian Parker’s account of the case in The New Yorker, for instance, is such an 
account.  See Parker, supra note 79. 
 84  See Kate Zernike, Judge Defends Penalty in Rutgers Spying Case, Saying It Fits Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A22. 
 85  As used in contemporary equal protection vernacular, selective prosecution 
means that a criminal law was enforced against a particular group for an 
impermissible reason–e.g., racism.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 
(1996). 
 86  See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76–135 (1997) (detailing 
history of unequal enforcement). 
 87  See id. at 29 (“Deliberately withholding protection against criminality . . . is one 
of the most destructive forms of oppression that has been visited upon African-
Americans.”). 
 88  See, e.g., id. at 41–48 (arguing southern states’ failure to enact or enforce anti-
lynching laws ensured white supremacy). 
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straightforward example of pure disjunction might be found in high-
profile pretextual prosecutions.  These are cases in which the 
government aggressively prosecutes for a crime that is unrelated to 
(and less serious than) the one prosecutors and the public believe 
the defendant is guilty of.  Al Capone’s conviction for tax evasion is 
illustrative.89  The highly publicized prosecution generated 
considerable expressive meaning.  That meaning could only have an 
ironic relation (at best) to the tax law under which Capone was 
prosecuted and the numerous more significant criminal laws under 
which he was not. 
B.  Prosecutorial Discretion and Expressive Conflict 
Expressive conflict is a defining feature of any large, pluralistic 
democracy.  There will, and should be, disagreement about how to 
address fundamental political and social questions.90  Both Stand 
Your Ground and hate-crime laws demonstrate prosecutors’ unique 
power to produce social and political meaning.  That expressive 
power does not depend upon obtaining convictions in particular 
cases.  It is particularly pitched where public opinion about a criminal 
law is fractured.  Consensus may be lacking because a law contains a 
controversial norm, as is the case with Stand Your Ground.  People 
have very different views on whether the State should permit 
individuals to “stand their ground” in situations where they feel 
threatened.  Alternatively, with hate crimes, consensus is lacking 
because the law contains an “incompletely theorized agreement”—
meaning there is broad agreement about a very general norm, but no 
agreement as to specifically when it should apply.91  Most people, for 
example, agree that racial discrimination is bad, but disagree as to 
what constitutes racial discrimination. 
1. Standing One’s Ground 
Trayvon Martin’s death and George Zimmerman’s subsequent 
prosecution rekindled expressive conflict over Florida’s Stand Your 
Ground law.  Many commentators blamed Florida’s ostensibly 
permissive self-defense law for both the Seminole County 
Prosecutor’s torpid response to Martin’s death and Zimmerman’s 
 
 89  See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 551. 
 90  See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 18, at xxv. 
 91  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 
1739 (1995). 
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subsequent acquittal.92  Those criticisms are redolent of the more 
general public criticism leveled against Stand Your Ground in 2005 
when Florida enacted it.93  The suggestion, however, that Stand Your 
Ground prevented Seminole County from bringing charges is belied 
by the fact that the subsequently appointed prosecutor brought 
charges against George Zimmerman.94  Zimmerman’s recent acquittal 
might appear to vindicate the Seminole County prosecutor’s initial 
refusal to prosecute.  That is only true, however, if one imagines 
prosecutors’ significance primarily in terms of obtaining convictions.  
Part III below develops the argument against that conception. 
Prosecutors have the capacity to do more than just obtain 
convictions—they have power to stir social and political meaning 
around contested social issues.  Criminal laws generally, and Stand 
Your Ground in particular, afford prosecutors considerable latitude 
with regard to bringing (or declining) cases.  Prosecutors’ expressive 
power is potentially independent of any conviction they might secure.  
George Zimmerman’s recent acquittal bolsters this point—the trial 
has impelled a national dialogue about race, violence, and self-
defense.  It may even be that the acquittal has made for more 
animated political dialogue than a conviction would have. 
Florida was the first state to adopt a so-called “stand your 
ground” statute in 2005.95  While the expressive flourish “stand your 
ground” has been a lightning rod for controversy, the law did not 
effect as a dramatic a change to Florida’s self-defense law as the 
controversy might suggest.  The actual changes that the 2005 law 
effected did not constrain prosecutorial charging discretion in a case 
like the Martin shooting any more so than the predecessor law did. 
The expression “stand your ground” appears in place of what had 
previously been an express duty to retreat.96  A number of states have 
eliminated the express duty to retreat,97 although only some have 
 
 92  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Acquitted in Trayvon Martin 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES at A1 (July 13, 2013); Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3.  
 93  See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
 94  See Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3. 
 95  See Ben Montgomery & Colleen Jenkins, Five Years Since Florida Enacted “Stand-
Your-Ground” Law, Justifiable Homicides are Up, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime 
/five-years-since-florida-enacted-stand-your-ground-law-justifiable/1128317.  
 96  Compare FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013), with Berrios v. State, 781 So. 2d 455, 
457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (describing duty to retreat required under common 
law and pre-2005 Florida statute).   
 97  See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(c)(2) (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050(4) 
(LexisNexis 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(b)(1) (2013).  
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elected to use the contentious phrase, “stand your ground.”98  
Eliminating an express duty to retreat need not restrain prosecutors’ 
charging leverage because self-defense still requires that the 
defendant have reasonably perceived an imminent threat of serious 
physical injury before using deadly force.99  One might argue that the 
perception of an imminent threat cannot be reasonable if it was 
readily possible to avoid it by retreating.100  At the very least, the 
reasonableness requirement means that Stand Your Ground is not 
purely subjective.  An individual who has an idiosyncratically pitched 
sense of vulnerability will not be able to claim self-defense when she 
“shoots first and asks questions later.”  While this is generally true of 
self-defense in most jurisdictions, Stand Your Ground does contain an 
important exception: when someone is in her home or car and uses 
deadly force against an invader, there is a presumption that she did 
so while in fear of imminent injury or death.101  The defendant need 
not demonstrate that she actually and subjectively feared imminent 
harm.  While this license to kill invaders is troublesome,102 it was never 
at play in the Zimmerman case since his encounter with Martin 
occurred outside. 
Expressive conflict over the law congealed around the 
expression “stand your ground” rather than any specific, substantive 
provision.103  The perception that Stand Your Ground was more 
permissive of defensive violence impelled public uproar, both for and 
against the law.104 Florida’s law was adapted from model legislation 
 
 98  See, e.g., ALA. CODE  § 13A-3-23(b) (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-411 
(2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5230 (2013); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C) (2013).   
 99  FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013). 
 100  While Florida’s Stand Your Ground law does not require a duty to retreat, it 
seems to permit the finder of fact to consider the possibility of retreat as relevant to 
reasonableness. See Williams v. State, 982 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).  
But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:20(D) (2013) (“No finder of fact shall be permitted to 
consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the 
person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief . . . .”).   
 101  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013). 
 102  See infra text accompanying note 217. 
 103  See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Bill Would Loosen Self-Defense, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 2005, at 1B; John-Thor Dahlburg, Florida Law Lets Citizens ‘Meet Force With 
Force,’ L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at 10; Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use 
Deadly Force in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18; Governor to Sign Deadly 
Force Bill, GAINESVILLE SUN (Apr. 6, 2005), 
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20050406/LOCAL/50405053 [hereinafter 
Deadly Force]. 
 104  See, e.g., Bousquet, supra note 103; Dahlburg, supra note 103; Goodnough, 
supra note 103.  
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crafted by the National Rifle Association (NRA).105  The NRA’s 
primary mission, of course, is to promote gun ownership and use.106  
Stand Your Ground was a potent battle cry for the organization and 
the Florida law was the first victory in what was to be a fairly successful 
national campaign.107  Stand Your Ground’s proponents extolled it as 
an affirmation of vigilant individualism in the face of an incompetent 
and paternalistic state, excoriating the government for its inability to 
protect individuals from violence and its insistence on prosecuting 
those who protected themselves.108 
The law’s opponents charged that Stand Your Ground would 
encourage (and reward) lawless individualism.  Gun-toting vigilantes 
would avenge the slightest slight with gunfire,109 eroding rule of law, 
and transforming Florida into a wild-west caricature.110  A gun control 
group went so far as to put up signs on Florida highways that read 
“Visitor Warning.  Florida residents can use deadly force.  Please be 
careful.”111  This debate echoes the historic conflict around self-
defense, and the duty to retreat in particular.112  Trayvon Martin’s 
 
 105  See Andrew Metz, NRA Targets New York, Other States with ‘Stand-Your-Ground’ 
Bill, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28, 2005; Kris Hundley, Susan Taylor Martin & Connie Humburg, 
‘Stand Your Ground’: A Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card, MIAMI HERALD (June 2, 2012), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/02/2830091 
/stand-your-ground-a-get-out-of.html; Susan Latham Carr, Bill Permits Use of Force 
Against Intruders, OCALA STAR-BANNER (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.ocala.com
/article/20050224/NEWS/202240398?p=1&tc=pg. 
 106  See About Us, NRA.COM, http://home.nra.org/history/document/about (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 107  Twenty-three states have enacted some version of Stand Your Ground, 
although not all of them necessarily include that particular expression. See Cora 
Currier, 23 Other States Have “Stand Your Ground” Too, ATLANTIC WIRE (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2012/03/23-other-states-have-stand-your-
ground-laws-too/50226/ (listing states and linking to specific statutes).   
 108  See Bousquet, supra note 103 (“Law-abiding people should not be told that if 
they are attacked, they should turn around and run . . . This bill gives back rights that 
have been eroded and taken away by a judicial system that . . . appears to give 
preferential treatment to criminals.” (quoting NRA lobbyist)); Deana Poole, Gun Bill 
Could Mean: Shoot First, Ask Later, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 23 2005, at 1A (“You should 
not have to retreat in order to save your life.” (quoting bill’s sponsor)). 
 109  See, e.g., David Royse, House Debates Bill Allowing Deadly Force, THELEDGER.COM 
(Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.theledger.com/article/20050401/NEWS/504010369 
(suggesting that law will permit deadly force in response to someone at a restaurant 
who “pushes you and reaches into their pocket”). 
 110  See, e.g., Deadly Force, supra note 103 (quoting state legislator opposed to the 
bill); Poole, supra note 108 108(“Florida could wind up back in the Wild West . . . .”).  
 111  John Pacenti, New Law On Deadly Force Caught In Gun Politics, PALM BEACH 
POST, Sep. 27, 2005, at 1B. See also id. (describing effort to leverage Florida’s reliance 
on tourist economy against Stand Your Ground law). 
 112  See Kahan, supra note 60, at 432–33. 
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death and Zimmerman’s subsequent acquittal seemed to confirm 
opponents’ fears.113 
Following Martin’s death, and in the acquittal’s wake, critics 
charge that Stand Your Ground devalues minority life in at least two 
ways.  First, by valorizing vigilantism and male aggression, it 
encourages the likes of George Zimmerman to (a) carry firearms and 
(b) impulsively shoot before reflecting on the nature of the threat an 
ostensible assailant poses.114  Social psychology researchers have 
demonstrated that most Americans subconsciously associate black 
youth with violence and criminality.115  To the extent that such 
feelings structure subconscious perceptions of others’ aggressiveness, 
we should expect individuals to be quicker to find black youth more 
threatening than white youth.116  If one accepts that Stand Your 
Ground encourages the use of force without reflection, one might 
expect young minorities to inordinately be on the receiving end of 
such violence. 
Second, critics charge that Stand Your Ground amplified 
prosecutorial lethargy in charging George Zimmerman and 
completely stymied prosecution in other less notorious cases.117  Stand 
Your Ground exacerbated prosecutors’ and police departments’ 
longstanding tendency to neglect minority crime victims.118  Critics 
have long highlighted how the systematic devaluation of minority life 
manifests as official disinterest in violent crime where minorities are 
the victims.119  But, it is unclear why Stand Your Ground would 
amplify that disinterest.120 As suggested above, Stand Your Ground 
 
 113  See Adam Nagourney, Prayer, Protests, and Anger Greet Florida Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2013, at A1. 
 114  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, A Florida Law Gets Scrutiny After a Killing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2012, at A1; Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at A21. 
 115  See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2044–52 (2011) (discussing research on implicit bias). 
 116  See Blow, supra note 114. 
 117  See, e.g., Anna Marie Smith, Deadly Force & Public Reason, THEORY & EVENT, Vol. 
15.3, 2012, at 7–8; Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note 105; Fred Grimm, 
Commentary: The Troubling History of Stand-Your-Ground Laws, MCCLATCHYDC (Mar. 24, 
2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/03/26/143105 
/commentary-the-troubling-history.html. 
 118  See KENNEDY, supra note 86, at 120; Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note 
105 (“Defendants claiming ‘stand your ground’ are more likely to prevail if the victim 
is black.”). 
 119  See KENNEDY, supra note 86, at 120. 
 120  Of course, this claim is not true in those cases involving home invasions and 
carjackings.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013). 
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affords prosecutors considerable discretion.121  Angela Corey 
exploited that discretion following the national protests demanding 
prosecution.122  Stand Your Ground no more foreclosed this than 
would have a statute not containing that phrase.  Of course, there are 
many who now say that the decision to prosecute was the wrong one 
and itself racially impelled—that is, the protests over the initial 
declination led to a race-conscious decision to prosecute.123 
Charging or declining to charge George Zimmerman would 
have both generated social meaning with regard to race.  The Florida 
legislature’s enactment of Stand Your Ground sent a general message 
that self-defense should be more broadly available.124  Had state 
prosecutors been particularly intent on amplifying that message, they 
might have stuck with the initial decision not to prosecute 
Zimmerman.  Doing so, however, would have tended to confirm 
protestors’ claims that Florida prosecutors do not value black victims.  
While Zimmerman’s acquittal also amplified the legislature’s 
message, it did so in a qualitatively different manner.  The trial 
produced a more sustained and farther-reaching conversation about 
race and violence than would have likely occurred otherwise.  While a 
good bit of it was partisan and shrill, much of it was not.  Part IV 
develops the argument that, from an expressive perspective, the 
acquittal was more constructive than declining to prosecute the case 
would have been.125 
That either declension or trial in the Zimmerman case would have 
been expressively rich is a function of the unique public attention 
that case has received.  Typically, declinations will fly under the 
expressive radar.  Prosecutors do not have any obligation to report 
declinations to the public.  Thus, it is difficult to say whether there 
 
 121  See, e.g., Severson, supra note 8; Simon & O’Neill, supra note 8. 
 122  See Serge F. Kovaleski, In Martin Case, Police Missteps Add to Challenges to Find 
Truth, N.Y. TIMES, MAY 17, 2012, at A1 (describing protests following Samford Police 
Department’s failure to arrest Zimmerman and Prosecutor Wolfinger’s suggestion 
that the case against Zimmerman should be put to a grand jury); Timothy Williams, 
Grand Jury Won’t Be Convened in Florida Teenager’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/us/trayvon-martin-prosecutor-wont-convene-
grand-jury.html?_r=0.  
 123  See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Op-Ed, Why Zimmerman Should Be Acquitted, N.Y. POST 
(July 11, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/07/11/why-zimmerman-should-be-
acquitted/. 
 124  This, at least, seems like the most plausible reading of the legislature’s 
symbolic gesture of including the “stand your ground” language in the revised self-
defense statute.  See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3). 
 125  See infra Part IV.B.i.   
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have been more declinations following Stand Your Ground’s 
enactment.126  It is even more difficult to say whether, broadly 
speaking, Stand Your Ground has impelled the kind of wild-west 
violence that critics feared or whether it has led to disproportionate 
minority victimization.127  There has been suggestion that such force 
has been on the rise.128  The reported uptick in self-defense claims in 
Florida, however, is consistent with any number of causal accounts of 
which increased civilian willingness to use deadly force is but one.  It 
could also be that prosecutors are less willing to decline such cases—
that is, more of them appear in the system.  Alternatively, entirely 
exogenous factors could create such an uptick—for example, 
increases in home invasions that, in turn, precipitate defensive force.  
At least one Florida newspaper has attempted to systematically 
assemble information on how prosecutors have exercised discretion 
in self-defense cases.129  But, the effort has yielded partial results at 
best.130  Better empirical data will not forever resolve expressive 
conflict over Stand Your Ground, self-defense, or minority 
victimization.131  But it would meaningfully inform and animate 
public dialogue. 
2.  Colorblind Hate Crime 
Prosecutors have considerable expressive power in the hate-
crime context because hate-crime laws are an example of what Cass 
Sunstein calls “incompletely theorized agreements.”132  Members of 
the public often agree about very general norms—for example, racial 
discrimination is reprehensible.  But, they disagree about how to 
apply those norms—for example, is affirmative action racially 
 
 126  But see Alvarez, supra note 114 (quoting Florida prosecutors who suggested 
that there have been a higher volume of self-defense claims in the wake of Stand 
Your Ground’s passage). 
 127  Although there have been media reports of both.  Media reports have 
indicated that self-defense claims have increased since the law was passed and that 
these defenses are frequently successful. See Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note 
105.  
 128  Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note 105. 
 129  Kris Hundley, Susan Taylor Martin & Connie Humburg, Florida ‘Stand Your 
Ground’ Law Yields Some Shocking Outcomes Depending on How Law Is Applied, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (Jun. 3, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/florida-
stand-your-ground-law-yields-some-shocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133. 
 130  See id. 
 131  See Susan Taylor Martin, Kris Hundley & Connie Humburg, Race’s Complex 
Role, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 4, 2012, at 1A. 
 132  Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1733, 1739.  
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discriminatory?133  The affirmative action example also highlights the 
difference between an “anti-subordination” perspective and an “anti-
classification” one.134  The former is concerned with practices that 
contribute to minority subjugation.  In contrast, the latter is 
concerned with practices that classify based on objectionable criteria 
regardless of whether subjugation results.135  The expressive conflict 
over hate-crime legislation was largely realized between these two 
poles.  The passage of hate-crime laws, however, did not actually 
resolve the fundamental debate between the two.  Because of hate-
crime laws’ open-ended wording, the debate’s resolution fell to 
prosecutors. 
Expressive conflict swirled about hate-crime legislation’s passage 
fifteen years ago.136  Proponents generally took an anti-
subordinationist tack, arguing that hate-crime laws would affirm the 
civic standing of groups that had historically been subject to 
discrimination.  Hate-crime laws were supposed to disavow the most 
violent manifestations of such discrimination.137  Doing so would 
recognize the unique stigmatic burdens such conduct imposes upon 
individual victims and their communities.138  The laws would also 
affirm society’s commitment to equality.139  Advocates have often 
sought passage of hate-crime legislation as part of a broader agenda 
to consolidate a group’s dignitary status.140  For example, the recent 
debate regarding “sexual identity” in the federal hate-crime statute 
was part of a broader campaign to secure state recognition of gay 
identity—a campaign that included the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t 
 
 133  Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1739.  
 134  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1537 (2004) 
(arguing that “anticlassification” rationale of Court’s recent Equal Protection Clause 
cases has limited the more radical “antisubordination” rationale that girds Brown v. 
Board of Education). 
 135  See id. 
 136  See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 60, at 463–67. 
 137  See Kahan, supra note 60, at 464.  Hate-crime legislation is often precipitated 
by high-profile instances of bias-motivated crime.  For example, in 2009 Congress 
enacted the “Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act” which, 
among other things, expanded existing federal hate-crime law to include “sexual 
orientation.”  Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2840 (2009).  Both Shepard and 
Byrd were victims in separate high-profile homicides that occurred in the late 1990s.  
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act was initially proposed in 1999.  See Beale, supra note 
69, at 1228 n.1 (detailing the bill’s early legislative history). 
 138  See Kahan, supra note 60, at 464. 
 139  See id. at 464–66.  
 140  See id. at 465–66.  
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tell” and legalizing gay marriage.141 
Critics of hate-crime legislation took an anti-classification tack. 
They impugned hate-crime legislation for violating basic equality 
principles by treating some crimes (and victims) more seriously than 
others based on the victim’s identity.142  Critics also pointed out that 
criminal law traditionally differentiated mens rea from motive, 
relegating the latter to an evidentiary question.143  These criticisms 
did not succeed in quelling widespread passage of hate-crime laws 
across the United States.144  Voting in favor of a hate-crime law was 
tantamount to proclaiming one’s commitment to civil rights and 
revulsion to bigotry.145  Legislatures could do so without any 
redistributive commitment of the kind associated with programs like 
affirmative action.  Legislatures did not even have to explicitly 
commit to an anti-subordination perspective.  Rather, the laws they 
passed were sufficiently vague such that they could be read 
consistently with both anti-subordination and anti-classification 
positions. 
All hate-crime statutes punish attacks carried out because an 
individual is (or is perceived by the assailant) to be part of a 
protected group.  By either creating a new crime or a sentencing 
enhancement,146 hate crimes increase punishment for engaging in 
independently criminalized conduct with animus towards a protected 
group.147  For example, the model legislation that the Anti-
Defamation League drafted in the early 1990s,148 and that many states 
have adopted, imposes criminal punishment for engaging in criminal 
conduct with impermissible bias.149  Similarly, the federal hate-crime 
law requires that the predicate criminal misconduct must have 
occurred “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or 
 
 141  In his reelection campaign, President Obama explicitly recognized these 
connections.  BARACKOBAMA.COM, President Obama and the Fight for LGBT Rights, 
YOUTUBE (May 23, 2013), http://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=Tb60nFeJsNc&feature=player_embedded. 
 142  See Kahan, supra note 60, at 465–66.  
 143  See JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND 
IDENTITY POLITICS 79–81 (1998). 
 144  This has been true for nearly a decade.  See id. at 3 (describing hate-crime laws 
in 1998 as a “routine category” of criminal law). 
 145  See id. at 67–68.  
 146  See id. at 29. 
 147  See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES STATUTES: A 1991 STATUS REPORT 
2–5 (1991). 
 148  See id. 
 149  See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 143 at 33–36. 
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national origin of any person . . . .”150 
Using race as an example,151 an anti-classification policy would 
compel a “colorblind” interpretation of the motive requirement. 
Colorblindness’ proponents view equality formalistically, as requiring 
across-the-board purging of race from public discourse.152  That an 
individual would attack another based on race, whatever that race 
may be, deserves rebuke for having committed a hate crime.  By this 
view, any racially motivated attack, majority-on-minority, minority-on-
minority, or even minority-on-majority, ought to be prosecuted as a 
hate crime. 
Anti-subordination proponents will view hate crimes very 
differently than anti-classification proponents, emphasizing their 
historic origin in remedying violent acts upon minorities.153  By an 
anti-subordination account, equality requires undoing the 
subjugation of minority groups.154  From this perspective, the State 
should only prosecute misconduct as a “hate crime” where the 
conduct, symbolically or otherwise, reaffirms a relation of domination 
between a dominant and subordinate group.  The anti-subordination 
proponent would likely be uncomfortable with, if not outright 
opposed, to the prosecution of minority-on-majority attacks and, 
possibly, minority-on-minority attacks as hate crimes.155 
The colorblind approach to hate crimes appears to have broad 
purchase among prosecutors.  One of the earliest hate-crime cases to 
reach the Supreme Court involved a colorblind reading of 
 
 150  18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2013).  See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 143 at 31 
(noting that “because of formulation” is a defining feature of hate-crime laws).   
 151  The majority of hate-crime incidences tend to involve racial animus. See LYNN 
LANGTON AND MICHAEL PLANTY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HATE CRIME 2003–2009 4, 10 & Table 14 (2011). 
 152  See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 43–46 (1991).   
 153  See Christopher Chorba, Note, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: 
Congressional Misconceptions and the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 320–21 (2001). 
 154  See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 152, at 63; Siegel, supra note 134, at 1545–46.  
 155  Cf. Gregory S. Parks & Shayne E. Jones, “Nigger”: A Critical Race Realist Analysis 
of the N-Word Within Hate Crimes Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1305, 1342–46 
(2008) (arguing that blacks should not be prosecuted for hate crimes even when 
using the epithet “nigger,” but that whites should).  An anti-subordinationist might 
support hate-crime prosecutions for intra-group attacks that somehow reaffirmed 
principles of racist domination. Cf. Doug Clark, Court Applies Hate-Crime Law Broadly, 
GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Mar. 3, 2010, at A11 (discussing state appellate court’s 
affirmation of hate-crime conviction where white man shot another white man 
because of former’s disapproval of the latter’s marriage to black woman).  
SEKHON (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:42 PM 
2014] THE PEDAGOGICAL PROSECUTOR 27 
 
Wisconsin’s hate-crime statute.  In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, Mitchell 
challenged Wisconsin’s hate- crime sentencing enhancement under 
the First Amendment.156  While his legal argument is not particularly 
important here, what is important is that Mitchell was black while his 
victim was white.157  Mitchell along with others, all of who were black, 
had recently watched the film Mississippi Burning.  Impelled by the 
film’s depiction of racist violence against blacks, Mitchell and his 
cohort attacked a white youth.158  The attack was clearly a felonious 
battery.  It was, however, only “racist” from a colorblind perspective.  
There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that such minority-on-
majority attacks are prosecuted as hate crimes with some regularity.159  
There is also anecdotal evidence suggesting that minority-on-minority 
attacks are prosecuted as hate crimes with some regularity.160  A 
recent homicide involving a South Asian victim in New York City 
illustrates this phenomenon.  The assailant, a Latina, pushed the 
victim into an oncoming subway train.161  In announcing its decision 
to pursue a hate-crime prosecution, the Queens D.A.’s office 
reported that she had made a remark to the police about the victim’s 
having been a Muslim (he was actually a Hindu).162  The D.A.’s 
decision is entirely consistent with a colorblind approach to hate 
crimes.  An anti-subordination proponent, however, might question 
 
 156  See 508 U.S. 476, 480–82 (1993). 
 157  See id.  
 158  See id.  
 159  See JACOB & POTTER, supra note 149, at 17 (discussing black-on-white crimes); 
Chorba, supra note 153, at 361–71 (describing cases in which black defendants were 
charged with racially-motivated hate crimes).  
 160  See, e.g., Police: Arrest in Long Island Hate-Crime Beating, N.Y. POST, (Aug. 22, 
2009), http://www.nypost.com/f/print/news/regional
/item_ZvAeoojuDbg4rqyOmkf6SK (attack on Ecuadorean immigrant by Hispanic 
man); Seven Black Teens Arrested for Hate Crimes After Video of Them ‘Attacking’ Latino Boy 
Posted on YouTube, N.Y. POST (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.nypost.com/p
/news/national/youtube_black_teens_arrested_attacking_Ca9Qxfp7DqZwKPsBribfL
K#ixzz1ux9LFGfY (black on Hispanic violence); Arthur Weinreb, Lesbians Charged 
with Hate Crime Against Gay Man, DIGITAL J. (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/320278 (lesbians charged with hate-crime for 
attacking gay man); cf. Kantele Franko, Amish Gather Before Entering Prison for Hate 
Crimes, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com
/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0411/Amish-gather-before-entering-prison-for-hate-
crimes; Erik Eckholm & Daniel Lovering, Renegade Group Is Accused in Bizarre Attacks 
on Fellow Amish in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A14 (stating that federal 
prosecutors were considering whether to file hate-crime charges). 
 161  See Marc Santora, Woman Is Charged with Murder as a Hate Crime in a Fatal 
Subway Push, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, at A15. 
 162  See id.  
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the capacity in which such a homicide reproduces relations of 
domination.163 
While difficult to make quantitative generalizations because of 
data limitations, one can infer from Bureau of Justice Statistics data 
that a colorblind approach to hate crimes may be widespread.  
During the period from 2003 to 2009, the majority of hate-crime 
victims were white.164  Conviction-maximizing prosecutors may have 
an incentive to embrace the colorblind interpretation of hate-crime 
laws.165  The more charges in an indictment/information, the greater 
the prosecutor’s leverage in charge and sentence bargaining—that is, 
the prosecutor’s bargaining position in plea negotiations.166  
Prosecutors’ interest in conviction maximization will lead them to 
interpret it broadly so that it applies in as many cases as possible.  By 
doing so, prosecutors will have endorsed a colorblind view of the 
world without having expressly declared it as policy. 
The classification versus subordination debate is not resolvable 
by simple reference to statutory language.  Nor is it resolvable by 
reference to any cohesive public viewpoint.  The terms of the debate, 
at bottom, track the expressive conflict that swirled around hate-
crimes laws when they were enacted.  Rather than resolving 
expressive debate, hate-crimes laws’ passage obfuscated it, by 
converting it into a question of prosecutorial discretion and driving it 
under the radar.  As with Stand Your Ground laws, it is difficult to say 
precisely why individual prosecutors wield their enforcement 
discretion as they do.  While there is some aggregate data about hate-
crime prosecutions and we can make generalizations about 
prosecutors’ institutional incentives, both speak to the invisibility of 
prosecutorial decision-making.  Prosecutorial choices will only rarely 
rekindle public debate—for example, when the rare defendant goes 
 
 163  The suspect’s history of mental illness would likely consolidate this view.  See 
Marc Santora & Anemona Hartocollis, Troubled Past For Suspect In Fatal Subway Push, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at A1. 
 164  Sixty-one percent of victims were white.  See LANGTON & PLANTY, supra note 
151, at 7 & Table 9.  The Bureau of Justice, however, does not track the race of 
suspects.  One might assume that the majority of these incidences involve non-race-
related bias (e.g., some these cases may consist of attacks motivated by some other 
non-racial discriminatory animus).  Given that race is the most frequent basis for a 
hate-crime charge though, a significant number of these attacks against whites were 
likely race-based.  LANGTON & PLANTY, supra note 151, at 4, 10 & Table 14 
 165  A number of scholars have noted prosecutors’ incentive to maximize 
convictions.  See Bibas, supra note 12, at 985–86; Luna & Wade, supra note 12, at 1508; 
Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–50. 
 166  See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–51. 
SEKHON (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:42 PM 
2014] THE PEDAGOGICAL PROSECUTOR 29 
 
to trial in a publicly remarked case,167 or when a public body actually 
rejects a hate-crime charge.168  Prosecutorial choices should have such 
rekindling effect with much greater regularity. 
C.  Think Globally, Prosecute Locally 
Because most district attorneys are elected in municipal or 
county elections,169 it is tempting to conclude that prosecutors should 
simply interpret criminal statutes in a manner that accords with local 
preferences.  This, however, is too parochial a conception of 
prosecutors’ expressive obligations for two reasons.  First, the local 
political unit is not necessarily the most representative political 
constituency when thinking about criminal laws enacted at the state 
level.  Second and related, the local political unit may be more prone 
to parochialism than larger political units.  This concern will be 
particularly acute where expressive conflict implicates minority 
interests. 
While local head prosecutors typically owe their jobs to local 
voters, they are charged with enforcing criminal laws that are, by and 
large, enacted at the state level.170  The vast majority of criminal laws 
in fact—for example, Stand Your Ground—are, like counties and 
municipalities themselves, created by state law.  The obligation to 
enforce state law evenhandedly should have broader moral sweep 
than pleasing one’s constituency.171  If one accepts this premise, the 
principal-agent problem should be conceived in terms of the whole 
state.  The obligation to enforce state criminal law evenhandedly is 
tantamount to a duty to the political community in whose name those 
laws were passed.  Seminole County Prosecutor Norman Wolfinger 
implicitly acknowledged this duty by withdrawing from the case 
 
 167  See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
 168  See, e.g., Frank Donnelly, Jury: Beating of Mexican Wasn’t ‘Hate,’ Staten Island 
Advance, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://blog.silive.com/northshore/print.html?entry=/2010/04/robbery_gang-
assault_—_but_no.html (grand jury rejected hate-crime charge in case where one 
Hispanic attacked another). 
 169  ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 11, 166 (More than ninety-five percent of 
district attorneys are elected in the United States). 
 170  But see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1470–72 (concluding that municipalities are increasingly 
enacting their own criminal laws).  
 171  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/mod
el_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_8_special_responsibilities_of_a_prosecutor
/comment_on_rule_3_8.html (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of 
justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
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against George Zimmerman.172  Wolfinger suggested that his office 
was unable to impartially investigate the Martin shooting in the face 
of the broad public uproar over the case.173 
The second related problem with imagining prosecutors’ 
political obligations in wholly local terms is that local communities 
can be parochial.  Some criminal-justice scholars have argued that 
local and sub-local communities exercise political power consistently 
with liberal ideals because of the intimate associations between 
victims, offenders, and other residents.174  The underlying notion 
here is that these communities have experiential knowledge of the 
full range of costs and benefits that crime and law enforcement 
generate.  Many have criticized this romantic view of localism.175  
“Political process failure” is possible in any heterogeneous 
community, even small ones.176  “Process failure” refers to an electoral 
majority’s willingness to consistently impose material or symbolic 
costs upon a disfavored minority.177  For example, if the majority of 
voters in a particular jurisdiction are homophobic, one would not 
expect the political process to encourage the prosecutor’s office to be 
particularly responsive to crimes targeting gay persons.178  But, 
localism may very well present even graver dangers if a community is 
small and relatively homogeneous. 
Richard Schragger has noted that disfavoring perceived 
 
 172  See Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3. 
 173  See Letter From Norman Wolfinger to Governor Rick Scott (Mar. 22, 2012),  
available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03
/3.22.2012WolfingerLetter.pdf.  
 174  See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis Of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 GEO. L. J.  1153, 1160–66, 1182 (1998); see also Unequal Justice, supra note 
9, at 2031–32 (arguing for more local control over criminal justice system).  But see 
Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 
93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 508–14 (2003) (criticizing “social norms” approach 
to policing “inner city”); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 371, 384–87 (2001) (same). 
 175  See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former 
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1005, 1010 (2003); Schragger, 
supra note 174, at 416–459.  
 176  See David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to 
the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L. J. 1059, 1086 (1999) (“[O]nce one 
looks beyond romanticized invocations of ‘the community,’ it becomes apparent that 
no community is united on these issues.”). 
 177  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 78–87 
(1980).  Criminal-law scholars have become increasingly interested in the notion of 
process failure.  See, e.g., Political Constitution, supra note 24, at 818. 
 178  Cf. Kahan, supra note 60, at 467 (discussing Texas case in which judge 
imposed lenient sentence upon a defendant who had killed two gay men). 
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outsiders is how some local communities consolidate their own self-
definition.179  Frequently, race plays a role in distinguishing insider 
from outsider.180  Many leveled a version of this criticism at Seminole 
County— by suggesting that police and prosecutors would have been 
quicker to act had Trayvon Martin been white.181  Voters in 
homogeneous communities may very well have settled views on 
matters that are hotly debated in the larger political unit of which 
that community is a part.  For example, one could imagine how a 
small, homogenous white community might be quicker to accept that 
minority-on-majority violence is best treated as a “hate crime” than a 
more diverse community might.  The opacity of most prosecutorial 
decision-making will generally mean that such enforcement choices 
go unremarked.  When police and prosecutors behave in a manner 
that is consistent with local political values, absent exceptional 
circumstances, local voters will not complain.  And there is unlikely to 
be very much notice of those choices on the outside.182  Prosecutorial 
opacity will quell political dialogue and obfuscate the political 
cleavages that exist between communities. 
The Martin shooting illustrates the dangers of political localism.  
Had the Martin shooting not received broad state and national 
attention, there is good reason to think that prosecutors would have 
been even slower to charge Zimmerman had they done so at all.  As 
discussed above, there was considerable expressive conflict over Stand 
Your Ground in 2005 when enacted.183  Seminole County, however, 
was not the epicenter of that opposition.  It is more than eighty 
percent white,184 middle-income,185 and republican.186  It is difficult to 
say what course the investigation/prosecution of Zimmerman would 
have taken had it been left entirely to the Seminole County 
 
 179  See Schragger, supra note 174, at 376, 404–05. 
 180  See Schragger, supra note 174, at 376, 404–05. 
 181  See Dan Barry, et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1. 
 182  The press has highlighted a number of other cases that seem similar to 
Martin’s, but had received virtually no attention until the Martin shooting.  See, e.g., 
Severson, supra note 8; Simon & O’Neill, supra note 8. 
 183  See supra notes 103–113 and accompanying text. 
 184  See United States Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, Seminole 
County, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12117.html (last visited Dec. 
24, 2013). 
 185  See id. 
 186  See Dave Trotter, Understanding the I-4 Corridor: Part II: Trending Seminole County, 
The Political Hurricane, http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/09/08
/understanding-the-i-4-corridor-part-ii-trending-seminole-county/ (last visited Dec. 
24, 2013). 
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prosecutor. 
While the Martin shooting and Zimmerman acquittals have 
impelled broad discussion of Stand Your Ground and self-defense 
laws, extra-local pressure has precipitated it.  Critical public 
sentiment did not rise organically in Seminole County and then 
spread outward.  In the shooting’s immediate wake, the local 
response was quite limited.  The Martin family and civil rights groups 
bear considerable responsibility for galvanizing public interest 
outside of Seminole County and Florida.  Several weeks elapsed 
before the Martin shooting became state and national news.187  The 
broad-based public outcry against the shooting, in turn, forced 
conversation about the relationship between race, Stand Your 
Ground laws, and enforcement discretion.  Regardless of one’s 
feelings about the Martin shooting in particular, the conversation is 
an important one.  Had it been left to voters in Seminole County, 
that dialogue may not have occurred.  Informed and ongoing public 
dialogue regarding such cleavages, even if heated, is healthy for our 
political culture.  The question then becomes what responsibility 
should prosecutors bear with regard to promoting and structuring 
such dialogue.  The next Part addresses that question. 
IV. THE PEDAGOGICAL PROSECUTOR 
This Part addresses the ends to which prosecutors should use the 
unique expressive power that Part III shows they possess.  While most 
scholars are concerned with how best to regulate prosecutors, this 
Part advances a vision of prosecutors holding both legislatures and 
the public accountable for their criminal justice policy preferences, 
biases, and blind spots. 
Drawing on liberal precepts, Section A argues that the ideal 
prosecutor should behave “pedagogically” vis-à-vis the legislature and 
public.  Behaving pedagogically means actively trying to advance 
constructive public dialogue around criminal justice norms, 
particularly (but not exclusively) those that have generated expressive 
conflict.  Behaving pedagogically would serve two functions.  First, it 
would promote constructive public dialogue, which liberal accounts 
suggest is essential to a vibrant democracy.  Second, it would impel 
legislatures to regularly revisit and reconsider criminal laws that they 
have passed in light of those laws’ real-world consequences. 
 
 187  See Simon & O’Neill, supra note 8 (noting, in an April news article, that the 
Martin shooting had occurred in February).  
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Section B sketches some practical implications that flow from 
the pedagogical ideal.  The pedagogical prosecutor would not be 
fixated on maximizing convictions.  There are cases where an 
acquittal should be chalked up as a prosecutorial success.  The 
pedagogical prosecutor would also be much more forthright about 
cases she declines to prosecute.  State government could take steps to 
advance the pedagogical ideal on both of these fronts. 
A. A Pedagogical Obligation 
Most scholarship on prosecutorial discretion culminates by 
proposing a series of regulatory reforms designed to improve 
prosecutorial accountability.188  But, legislatures and the public must 
also be held accountable for their preferences, biases, and blind 
spots. Accountability is ideally a two-way street.  The discussion above 
has argued that prosecutors are uniquely positioned to play this role.  
Accordingly, the ideal prosecutor would behave “pedagogically.” 
“Pedagogically,” means actively trying to inform and educate 
citizens and the legislature for the purpose of impelling political 
dialogue.  This obligation would be in addition to (not in lieu of) the 
obligation to do justice in individual cases.189  This pedagogic 
obligation flows from the unique position that prosecutors inhabit 
within the criminal justice system: in addition to their unique 
expressive power, prosecutors have a near-monopoly on information 
regarding the criminal justice system’s inputs, outputs, and the 
relation between the two.  Prosecutors screen the pool of incidents 
that the police refer to them for charging.  Prosecutors have near 
complete discretion on whether to proceed in any particular case.190  
And, of course, prosecutors have considerable leverage with regard to 
how a case will be disposed of—by trial, plea, or some other 
mechanism.191  There is no other actor in the criminal justice system 
that is as well situated to describe how the pool of prospective 
offenders relates to those who are convicted. 
The notion of a pedagogic obligation is anchored in a liberal 
conceptualization of the state and criminal justice.  In most liberal 
accounts, the state’s legitimacy hinges on citizen consent.192  A 
 
 188  See supra Part II.   
 189  See infra Part IV.B.iii. 
 190  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1995). 
 191  See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 13, at 2129, 2132–33. 
 192  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 6 (1980); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15–18 (1971); Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 
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properly functioning liberal state will respond to the people’s will 
within specified constraints—that is, a political process and system of 
civil rights that forecloses fundamental unfairness to individuals.193  
This conception accepts policy-making as the site of contest and takes 
structured debate as a necessary feature of democratic coexistence.194  
In idealized liberal accounts, citizens are well informed, engaged with 
each other, and prepared to change their minds in response to good 
arguments.195  The more complex a state becomes the more opaque 
its bureaucratic functions will come to seem; citizens will be less able 
to ascertain what the state is actually doing and what the 
consequences of any given policy choice are.  Filling such 
information gaps is necessary for political dialogue and governance 
by consent to remain meaningful.  This is particularly true with 
regard to criminal justice policy. 
Imposing criminal sanctions has unique significance in a liberal 
state.196  It is the paradigmatic example of the state’s monopoly on 
“legitimate violence.”  It is by authority of criminal law that the state 
forcibly removes an individual from society, brands him a “criminal,” 
and subjects him to confinement or other deprivation.  Accordingly, 
one would expect the ideal liberal citizen to be particularly attentive 
to the content and consequences of criminal law.197  This would be all 
the more true for criminal laws over which there has been expressive 
conflict.  Because these are, by definition, laws over which citizens 
disagree—that is, where consent is fractured—liberal precepts of 
responsive government require regular reconsideration of such laws’ 
validity in light of changing social circumstances. 
Prosecutors are the best positioned to play the pedagogical 
function that a liberal criminal justice system requires.  The 
pedagogical prosecutor would make choices that are not just 
designed to maximize her office’s conviction rate, but rather, to 
educate legislators and the public.  “Pedagogical” specifies a relation 
of public trust without limiting the relevant public to a narrow 
 
YALE L. J. 1022, 1038 (2007) (book review). 
 193  See RAWLS, supra note 18, at xliii–xliv. 
 194  See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 192, at 6, 70, 73, 88; RAWLS, supra note 18, at 
xliii–xliv. 
 195  See RAWLS, supra note 18, at xlix (describing notion of “civic friendship”). 
 196  See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 307, 314 (2004). 
 197  The average and ideal citizen are, of course, different things. See RAWLS, supra 
note 18, at 16 (describing idealized citizen in the “original position”). 
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electoral unit.198  The pedagogical prosecutor would both share 
information that is relevant to expressive debate and exercise her 
charging and sentencing discretion in ways that promote constructive 
public dialogue.  The primary point here would not be to promote 
prosecutorial accountability (though that might be a useful 
byproduct).  Rather, it would be to impel belief-testing within the 
political community.  While such a process may lead to tentative 
political agreements, it is unlikely to do so in permanent ways—that is 
both the joy and frustration of pluralistic democracy.  Accordingly, 
the pedagogical prosecutor’s goal should not be to steer the public 
towards a particular political result.  Rather, the goal should be to 
promote broad engagement with issues of critical importance to our 
collective political life. 
A completely theorized agreement is likely impossible with 
regard to self-defense and hate-crime laws.199  Not only are these the 
kinds of issues around which we should expect disagreement, people 
imagine these issues as continuous with other ideological 
commitments that define their political identities.200  For example, a 
libertarian might see a permissive self-defense rule tightly braided 
with anti-gun control and anti-tax positions.  Critics of the 
Zimmerman acquittal inveighed against racism, gun control, and 
violence, often in the same breath.201  Identity’s salience in debates 
over these issues means that they are probably not susceptible to 
enduring political or technocratic resolution.  This is not to say that 
individuals and institutions will doggedly embrace the same positions 
over time. 
For example, how would discussion around hate crimes change 
if it became clear that prosecutions were often for minority-majority 
attacks or petty crimes?  Opposition to the expansion of hate-crime 
statutes might ease.  Civil rights groups might more aggressively 
advocate for the passage of laws that expressly embraced anti-
subordination principles.  Perhaps hate crimes would appear like an 
altogether less attractive technique for advancing a civil rights 
agenda.  Or how would the terms of discussion change regarding 
Stand Your Ground if it emerged that the vast majority of self-defense 
claims involved the use of force during a home invasion?  What if it 
 
 198  See supra Part III.C.  
 199  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 200  See Kahan, supra note 60, at 464–66. 
 201  See, e.g., Michael Muskal, Zimmerman Not Guilty, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at 1; 
Nagourney, supra note 113.  
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was also clear that these were the kinds of cases that prosecutors were 
least likely to prosecute under the old statute? 
A pedagogical model of prosecutorial discretion challenges the 
norms of bureaucratic invisibility that currently insulate prosecutors 
from scrutiny, relieve legislatures from responsibility for enacting 
sensible laws, and save citizens from having to think too much about 
the content or consequences of their knee-jerk beliefs about criminal 
justice.  As discussed in Part II, most prosecutorial choices are made 
well below the horizon of public notice.202  While such invisibility may 
be an inevitable feature of criminal justice machineries that are as 
sprawling and fragmented as our own,203 it starves our political culture 
of information and dialogic impetus.  It allows all of us to embrace 
easy solutions to complex problems about which we disagree—for 
example, the notion that simply “repealing” Stand Your Ground will 
prevent future Trayvon Martins from dying.204 
A pedagogical model contemplates a shift in prosecutorial 
sensibility from an inward-looking, conviction orientation to an 
outward-looking, pedagogical orientation.  As matters now stand, 
high “conviction rates” tend to be presented and received by the 
public as evidence of prosecutors’ ability.  This, of course, is as much 
a statement about how prosecutors campaign for reelection as it is 
about voters’ expectations and attention spans.205  A pedagogical 
ethos would value public airing for its own sake, regardless of what 
outcomes it produced in particular cases. 
It would not be radical for prosecutors to privilege “public 
airing”—it has deep precedent in our legal system.  Public airing’s 
pedagogical benefits have been long-recognized—for example, 
among the rationales justifying trial by jury is the benefit that inures 
to jurors by virtue of participating in an intensively deliberative civic 
process.206 The benefit extends beyond the jury room.  After 
 
 202  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting federal 
prosecutors’ “broad discretion”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 203  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 461 
(1993) (“[T]he criminal justice ‘system’ is not a system at all.”). 
 204  This would be particularly unhelpful if “repeal” simply meant eliminating the 
“stand your ground” language in the Florida’s self-defense statute.  See supra Part 
III.B.i. 
 205  See Bibas, supra note 12, at 983–91. 
 206  See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (“The opportunity for 
ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been 
recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system.”); but 
see Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1622–24 (2011) 
(suggesting that the jury’s role has become precariously symbolic and that its vitality 
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completing their service, jurors discuss their experiences with those 
around them and are generally more inclined to participate in other 
civic activities.207 
A public airing—for example, a trial or some other sort of 
hearing with witness testimony—has pedagogical value for two 
primary reasons.  First, because of its intrinsically dramatic nature, a 
public airing is likely to attract attention—certainly much more so 
than disposition by agreement or some other mechanism that does 
not entail a public re-telling of the incident.  The prospect of 
attracting attention will be even higher where the applicable criminal 
law is (or has been) the subject of expressive conflict. 
Second, public airing highlights how contested legal principles 
play out in concrete circumstances.  It provides fact-rich data points 
to inform expressive claims.  This allows legislators and citizens to 
reevaluate their expressive commitments prior to returning to the 
debate—a kind of personal exercise in reflective equilibrium.208  Were 
the legislatures’ premises for enacting a law correct?  Does the law 
produce the outcomes that gave rise to expressive conflict in the first 
place?  It may be idealistic to expect large numbers of people to 
regularly change their minds about issues they care about after 
having engaged in some form of liberal dialogue.  But, the vitality of a 
democratic society does not require that some fixed number of minds 
be changed in the course of any particular dialogic bout.  The 
ultimate purpose is not to achieve a final political consensus, but to 
continue debate, reconsider existing policies and, hopefully, increase 
political engagement in the process.209 
B.  Implications 
Vigorous commitment to the kind of public airing that the 
pedagogical obligation requires could have a range of practical 
consequences.  Most salient among them would be an increased 
number of criminal trials and systematic disclosures about cases that 
 
is at risk). 
 207  See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 
661 (2002) (noting Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that jury is an important 
device for populist, civic education); Mary Lombardi, Note, Reassessing Jury Service 
Citizenship Requirements, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 725, 759–60 (2009) (summarizing 
social science studies). 
 208  Cf. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 48 (describing “reflective equilibrium” as process 
whereby theoretical commitments are tempered and adjusted in light of existing 
social and political arrangements).  
 209  See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 226–27, 241, 243. 
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are pled or declined.  State governments could help overcome local 
political hurdles.  In addition, prosecutors might be encouraged to 
live up to the ideals sketched in Section A by including them in the 
rules of ethics. 
1.  Trying Tough Cases 
Prosecutors taking their pedagogical responsibility seriously 
would have significant consequences for trial practice generally, and 
“tough cases” in particular.  “Tough,” refers to plausible cases where 
securing a conviction may be challenging or particularly resource 
intensive.  For such cases, prosecutors may be inclined to offer steep 
charge or sentencing discounts as part of plea offers.  These might be 
cases with particularly ambiguous or complicated facts.  They might 
be cases that do not fit within the ambit of what was legislatively (or 
popularly) contemplated by a law’s proponents when enacted.  This 
may be especially true for cases involving laws that have been the 
subject of expressive conflict.210  Measuring prosecutorial success 
largely in terms of convictions will lead prosecutors to make choices 
that do little to stimulate broad debate.  “Losing” tough cases that 
further constructive public dialogue should be recognized as success.  
If criminal trials were valued for their own sake (i.e., without regard 
for outcome), prosecutors might be less inclined to obtain 
convictions by agreement in “tough cases.”  States could make this 
possible by helping prosecutors overcome local political obstacles to 
such public airing. 
Zimmerman is an example of a tough case.  The acquittal did not 
detract from the case’s pedagogical value and, perhaps, even 
amplified it.  Trayvon Martin’s shooting was evocative of just the sort 
of vigilantism that Stand Your Ground’s opponents warned of.  
Moreover, it demonstrated the racial consequences such vigilantism 
can have.211  Martin’s death created a plausible criminal case, but 
there were significant evidentiary challenges. The prosecutor had to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Zimmerman 
intentionally killed Martin, but there was little direct evidence on the 
subject—Zimmerman had eliminated the best witness.212 
The acquittal, of course, precipitated protests, far-ranging 
commentary on race’s continuing significance in our society, and the 
 
 210  See supra notes 99–113 and accompanying text.   
 211  See supra notes 3–8, 109–112 and accompanying text. 
 212  See Lizette Alvarez, Zimmerman Trial, Opening This Week, Will Raise Complex 
Questions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at A16.  
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relationship between self-defense and gun violence. 213  While some of 
the discussion has been predictably partisan, much of it has not.214  
Calls to reconsider Stand Your Ground laws have come from some 
surprising quarters.215  Even if “Stand Your Ground” is primarily a 
rhetorical flourish,216 there are aspects of these laws, beyond the 
flourish, that are worth reconsidering.  For instance, Florida’s law 
contains provisions that discourage public airing.  Where a would-be 
defender uses deadly force in her home or car, no inquiry is 
permitted into whether she subjectively experienced fear of 
imminent injury.217  This forecloses trial in both ambiguous and 
unambiguous cases—that is, the presumption is not rebuttable 
regardless of how obviously the would-be defender did not fear 
imminent harm. 
Whether Zimmerman precipitates specific changes in Stand Your 
Ground laws, however, should not be the measure of its pedagogical 
effect.  It is the calls to reconsider (and rejoinders thereto) in and of 
themselves that are the proper measure.  A liberal state’s vitality 
hinges on regularly revisiting contested social questions and airing 
different views.218  Sometimes this will quickly precipitate changes in 
laws or social norms; other times slowly; and other times not at all.  It 
is this iterative process, as opposed to any tentative consensus around 
a particular issue, that the pedagogical prosecutor should seek to 
sustain. 
Blindly encouraging defendants to plead guilty in tough cases 
presents a sharp threat to democratic vitality.  While it is common to 
lament criminal trials’ endangered species status,219 few have 
 
 213  See Muskal, supra note 201; Nagourney, supra note 113; Adam Aaro, Money 
Raised To Buy Zimmerman a New Gun, FOX NEWS (Aug. 3, 2013), 
http://www.myfox28columbus.com/template/cgi-bin/archived.pl?type=basic&file
=/shared/news/features/top-stories/stories/archive/2013/07/sCQ08lLL.xml; 
Regina Garcia Cano, George Zimmerman Gets $12,000 Towards Buying Gun from Ohio 
Firearms Group, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2013, 1:11 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/26/george-zimmerman-
gun_n_3660067.html.  
 214  President Obama explicated black perceptions of the criminal justice system, 
but also urged all to accept the Zimmerman acquittal. See Nagourney, supra note 113. 
 215  Senator John McCain forcefully exhorted state legislatures to review Stand 
Your Ground statutes.  See Geoff Earle, Mac Rips ‘Stand Ground,’ N.Y. POST, July 22, 
2013, at 5.  
 216  See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 217  See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing presumption of 
reasonableness). 
 218  See supra Part IV.A. 
 219  See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 206, at 1622–23 & nn.301–03 (summarizing 
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recognized that their rarity takes an expressive toll.  While 
prosecutorial declinations are quite literally “under the radar,”220 
pleas are functionally the same from an expressive perspective.  
Although there will be a public record of pleas, that record is unlikely 
to play much role in public debate.  Pleas are taken after minimal 
factual investigation and are not recorded in ways that are especially 
accessible.221  The proliferation of criminal laws gives prosecutors a 
powerful chip with which to negotiate convictions.222  Prosecutors 
have near-absolute discretion to file or drop charges against a 
defendant.  Offering to drop charges in exchange for a plea on those 
that remain is a powerful strategy for extracting pleas.223 
Hate crimes further illustrate the democratic harms that may 
result from failing to try tough cases.  Hate-crime prosecutions for 
minority-on-minority or minority-on-majority crimes are likely to 
grate against many proponents’ view of those laws’ purposes.224  A 
widespread colorblind interpretation of hate-crime laws might lead 
minority advocacy groups to reconsider whether hate-crime laws 
advance those communities’ interests.  And yet, prosecutors are likely 
to adopt a colorblind interpretation of hate-crime laws “under the 
radar.”  Hate crimes will always overlap extensively with other 
crimes.225  This may have the effect of amplifying prosecutorial 
leverage in plea bargaining.  Assume a case involving a black-on-black 
battery in which the defendant called the victim a “nigger.”226  In a 
jurisdiction where prosecutors believe a colorblind reading of the 
causation requirement is plausible, a prosecutor might charge a hate 
crime in hopes of using it as leverage to extract a plea on the 
underlying battery charge.227 Assuming that such a practice results in 
 
literature). 
 220  This Article is not suggesting that prosecutors try implausible cases.  They 
should, however, be more transparent about the kinds of cases they are not trying.  
See infra Part IV.B.ii.   
 221  See infra Part IV.B.ii. 
 222  See Political Constitution, supra note 24, at 802–04. 
 223  See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 111–13 (advocating for limit on charge 
bargaining).  
 224  See supra notes 153–155 and accompanying text.  By the same token, it is likely 
to allay many critics’ fears.  
 225  See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text. 
 226  See Parks & Jones, supra note 155, at 1342–43. 
 227  In a jurisdiction where the hate-crime statute was a sentencing enhancement, 
we might expect a similar dynamic to play out in the form of sentencing bargaining.  
See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 111.  While there are important differences between 
charge and sentence-bargaining, for present purposes the basic dynamic is the same: 
the prosecutors’ interest in obtaining a conviction impels a de facto policy of 
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more pleas (or longer sentences) in cases where hate crimes can be 
plausibly charged, we should expect conviction-maximizing 
prosecutors to drift towards a policy of colorblindness.  That policy 
choice, however, would never be formally announced as such. 
A pedagogical vision of the prosecutorial function aspires to 
more than just a shift in prosecutorial behavior.  It contemplates a 
broad, long-term shift in public culture and expectations.  
Prosecutors likely view success or failure in terms of their conviction 
rate because the voting public tends to.  In the wake of George 
Zimmerman’s acquittal, there has been extensive commentary on the 
prosecutors’ various strategic errors in trial.228  Whether true or not, 
that mode of evaluating the trial entirely overlooks its expressive 
significance.  Given that head prosecutors tend to be local politicians, 
it may be unrealistic to expect them to unilaterally embrace the 
pedagogical model.  For example, Seminole County voters might very 
well have held it against their elected prosecutor if he had prosecuted 
Zimmerman.  Of course, it was not Seminole County’s prosecutor 
that was, ultimately, responsible for the prosecution.229  This hints at 
ways in which state governments could help advance pedagogical 
prosecuting. 
State governments should make resources available to prosecute 
expressively significant cases.  Doing so would help relieve local 
prosecutors of the political burdens that might complicate such 
efforts.  It could also help mitigate the impetus to plea bargain tough 
cases.  Such support could simply take the form of additional state 
funding to litigate tough cases, although this would not speak to the 
conviction-maximizing incentives that local politics create.  A more 
ambitious approach might involve state governments creating 
specialized state-level prosecutorial units that are specifically charged 
with litigating “tough cases.”  This would not be so different from the 
specialized prosecutorial units that some states create to deal with 
specialized or complex cases.230 
 
colorblindness.  See supra notes 151–163 (discussing colorblindness versus anti-
subordination).   
 228  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Self-Defense, Hard To Topple, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at 
A1. 
 229  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 230  For example, in New York State the Attorney General’s office is responsible 
for prosecuting specific categories of crime.  See e.g., Criminal Enforcement and 
Financial Crimes Bureau, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureau/criminal-prosecutions-bureau (last visited Nov. 12, 
2013). 
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This brief sketch, of course, leaves a host of operational 
questions about case selection and the division of authority between 
local and state prosecutors.  There are a variety of schemes 
imaginable on both fronts.  State prosecutors could select cases, local 
prosecutors could refer cases, or there could be some collaborative 
intermediate approach.  Cases could be selected according to criteria 
determined in advance by the legislature, prosecutors, or some other 
entity.  Alternatively, local or state prosecutors could be left to make 
ad hoc discretionary judgments.  This is intended as a jumping-off 
point only—programmatic details should be the subject of future 
research. 
2. Filling the Information Gap 
While trial is a powerful device for impelling public dialogue, it 
is not the only device.  In most jurisdictions, it is unlikely that 
prosecutors can try every plausible case.  And, of course, there will be 
cases that are facially implausible and are appropriately declined.  
With a law like Stand Your Ground, the legislature’s express purpose 
seems to have been, in part, to encourage more declinations.  Pleas 
are low-visibility choices while declinations are entirely invisible.  For 
these choices to play any role in stimulating public dialogue, they 
must be more visible.  Prosecutors should systematically make 
information available regarding these choices.  At the most general 
level, such information should include interpretations of criminal 
laws—particularly those around which there has been expressive 
conflict—and general enforcement priorities.  Such information 
should also include specific details regarding cases that were declined 
or resolved by plea. 
Prosecutors have wide policy-making discretion.  Prosecutors 
should clearly announce their policy choices as such.  Doing so would 
provide important information to legislators, advocacy groups, and 
the public about a law’s consequences.  Hate-crime laws present a 
good example of how this might work.  As discussed, lexical 
ambiguity regarding the motive requirement in hate-crime laws 
echoes the expressive contest that attended passage of the laws.231  
The hypothetical discussion in Part IV.B.i illustrated how a 
conviction-maximizing prosecutor will, in effect, tend towards a 
colorblind interpretation of the causation requirement.  Prosecutors 
should announce such choices clearly.  Such a move has precedent.  
 
 231  See Part III.B.ii. 
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In some jurisdictions, for example, prosecutors have announced 
official policies not to seek the death penalty.232 
The salutary effects of announcing office policy need not be 
limited to interpretations of laws that have been subject to expressive 
conflict.  There may be criminal laws on the books that have long 
gone unquestioned, but should be at the center of expressive debate.  
For example, in 2004, the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office 
announced that prosecuting low-level sex workers was not an 
enforcement priority.233  The statement impelled proponents and 
detractors to debate the merits of criminalizing commercial sex.234  A 
prosecutor’s office could take a similar tack with any number of laws 
that seem outmoded or unjust.   
Of course, a pithy policy statement regarding enforcement 
priorities will not always be possible or helpful.  It may, for example, 
be impossible to imagine the myriad circumstances in which a 
defendant would plausibly raise a self-defense claim.  To ask 
prosecutors to declare a general policy regarding Stand Your Ground 
might not be especially helpful.  It would, however, be helpful if 
prosecutors were forthcoming about concrete choices they made 
regarding such cases after the fact—that is, the decision to decline 
prosecution.  This is true even in instances where a prosecutor’s 
office commits itself to a particular policy position.  Data regarding 
actual prosecutions and declinations will help observers ascertain 
what difference, if any, a particular law is having in the world. 
Declination and plea data present particularly pressing 
informational gaps.  While an enterprising researcher might be able 
to construct a rough profile of declined cases based on police reports, 
this is a tall task and likely to be incomplete.235  In many cases, it will 
be impossible to know with certainty why prosecutors elected to 
decline a particular case.  Prosecutors do not typically make such data 
available and, even in the rare cases that they do, they are not entirely 
transparent about their motivations.236  Information regarding pleas 
 
 232  See, e.g., Leigh B. Beinen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the 
Ryan Commutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1377 n.307 (2010).  
 233  See Philip Matier & Andrew Ross, Cops, D.A. Tangle over Strip Club Raids, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 12, 2004, at B1, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/Cops-D-A-tangle-over-strip-club-
raids-3324156.php#page-2.  
 234  Id. 
 235  See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text. 
 236  See Black Box, supra note 13, at 151–154. 
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will be more readily obtainable because it is public record; however, 
as with declinations, it would take a behemoth effort to gather and 
assemble the information to be useful for stimulating public debate.  
Using Stand Your Ground as an example, it would take substantial 
effort to compile a profile of how initial charging decisions relate to 
final convictions in cases where a defendant has alleged self-defense. 
For example, let’s assume that, following Stand Your Ground’s 
enactment, Florida prosecutors began routinely reducing 
manslaughter charges to misdemeanor assault charges in cases where 
there was a self-defense claim.  It would be difficult to gather the 
information necessary to demonstrate that reality.  An investigator 
would have to scour court records in various jurisdictions, review files 
for individual cases, and compare pleas to the original indictments.  
Were such an endeavor possible, it would still reveal little about 
prosecutors’ motivations.  Ascertaining information about the race of 
the victim or the circumstances under which defensive force was used 
might very well require obtaining the police report and interviewing 
witnesses.  This is to say that, even where information is publicly 
available, it is buried in documents managed by different 
bureaucracies.  To be a useful resource for public debate, such 
information would have to be assembled in a user-friendly way.237  
While we should expect prosecutors to be more forthright with 
information relevant to public debate, state attorney general offices 
(or some other centralized bureaucracy) should collect and assemble 
it.  Stand Your Ground is a good vehicle for roughly sketching how 
this might work. 
Prosecutors should provide relevant information regarding their 
decisions to decline prosecution in cases involving self-defense.  They 
should provide information that is germane to the expressive debate 
that characterizes self-defense in general and Stand Your Ground in 
particular.  Opponents argue that Stand Your Ground encourages 
lawless violence that unduly impacts minorities.  Proponents contend 
that Stand Your Ground allows individuals to protect themselves from 
violent attacks.  From these simple statements of position, it is clear 
that several pieces of information regarding declination decisions 
would usefully inform public discussion: the nature of the defensive 
force (e.g., gunshot); its consequence (e.g., death); the injured 
individual’s race and gender; the race and gender of the individual 
 
 237  But see Black Box, supra note 13, at 186–87 (describing Bureau of Justice 
Statistics and how the information it compiles is intended for “a small number of 
sophisticated or committed users. . .”).   
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who used defensive force; and summary case facts.  Summary case 
facts should include a brief narrative of the case that addresses those 
dimensions of the incident that are most relevant to expressive 
debate around self-defense.  For example, that an individual used 
force against another who was in the midst of a home invasion would 
be obviously relevant to expressive debate. Similarly relevant might be 
the fact that force was used in response to domestic violence.  All the 
case circumstances that might be relevant to expressive debate 
cannot be identified in advance.  We would, in large measure, have to 
rely upon pedagogical prosecutors’ good judgment. 
3.  Defining “Justice” 
The absence of political will to regulate prosecutors and the 
absence of competent regulators will stymie any external effort to 
constrain (or direct) prosecutorial discretion.  As discussed in Part II, 
the absence of a plausible mechanism for achieving sweeping control 
of prosecutorial prerogative has led a few scholars to focus on 
internal, managerial, and technocratic reform.238  What these 
approaches might claim in the way of practicality, they surrender in 
the way of normative ambition.  This tension pervades all scholarship 
about prosecutorial agency, this piece included.  There is likely no 
grand solution to the problem.  Changing how prosecutors and the 
public engage one another will require myriad technocratic, cultural, 
and financial shifts.  Systematically plotting those changes is beyond 
this (or any single) article’s scope.  It makes sense to think about 
reforms that will nudge prosecutors to voluntarily behave in the ways 
suggested by this Article.  One place to start might be ethical rules for 
prosecutors. 
Rules of ethics suggest that prosecutors’ primary obligation is to 
do “justice.”239  The notion of justice should explicitly embrace a 
pedagogical function.  Ethical rules, however, tend to focus on the 
panoply of constitutional rules that define prosecutor’s 
responsibilities in individual cases.240  Justice, however, entails 
something more than obeying the Constitution.  That is especially 
true given the discretionary breadth that prosecutors enjoy.  The 
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Constitution leaves it to prosecutors to make all sorts of decisions 
without judicial review.  “Justice” should have some bearing on how 
prosecutors exercise that discretion.  Ethical rules might therefore 
give more precise content to the word “justice.”  In particular, justice 
should require that prosecutors bear some pedagogical responsibility 
in cases involving expressive conflict.  The obligation to advance 
public dialogue in such cases might be achieved in any number of 
ways, three of which are discussed in the section above.  As an initial 
matter, it may be wise to formulate the ethical obligation broadly, 
leaving considerable leeway for prosecutorial judgment on what 
constitutes expressive conflict.  The ultimate goal is to begin an 
acculturation process through which prosecutors will internalize a 
pedagogical self-perception over time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prosecutors have unique expressive power in a pluralist 
democracy like our own.  Cases implicating Stand Your Ground and 
hate-crimes laws powerfully illustrate this argument.  The expressive 
conflict over Stand Your Ground implicates urgent questions about 
the relationship between individualism, violence, and criminal law.  
The expressive conflict over hate crimes implicates urgent questions 
about equality and minorities’ dignitary status.  In neither context did 
enacting laws exhaust the basis of expressive conflict.  Rather, the 
laws’ passage shifted the locus of expressive power from legislatures 
to prosecutors’ offices. 
A healthy, pluralist democracy benefits from sustained dialogue 
in legislatures and amongst citizens.  Pedagogical prosecutors would 
systematically use their expressive power to promote such dialogue.  
In advancing a pedagogical ideal for prosecutors, this Article has 
advocated for a shift in both prosecutorial and political culture.  
Prosecutors should learn to think of success in much broader terms 
than simply obtaining convictions.  By the same token, the public 
must learn to credit prosecutors who are actively pedagogical, even if 
it comes at the price of a lower conviction rate.  In such a world, 
prosecutors would not have been slow to prosecute George 
Zimmerman.  Nor would the public have been quick to view the 
acquittal as a sign of failure. 
 
